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SAVERS, SPENDERS AND FISCAL POLICY IN A 




This paper analyzes the effects of fiscal policy in an open economy. We extend the savers-
spenders theory of Mankiw (2000) to a small open economy with endogenous labor supply. 
We first show how the Dornbusch (1983) consumption-based real interest rate for open 
economies is modified when labor supply is endogenous. We then turn to the effects of fiscal 
policy when there are both savers and spenders. With this heterogeneity taken into account, 
tax cuts have a short-run contractionary effect on domestic production, and increased public 
spending has a short-run expansionary effect. Although consistent with recent empirical work, 
this result contrasts with those of most other theoretical models. Transitory changes in 
demand have permanent real effects in our model, and we discuss the implications for real 
exchange-rate dynamics. We also show how “rational” savers may magnify or dampen the 
responses of “irrational” spenders, and show how this is related to features of the utility 
functions. 
JEL Code: E21, E62, F41. 
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Economists typically base their analyses of ￿scal policy on forward-looking theories of
consumer behavior; namely, the representative-agent permanent-income model or the
life-cycle overlapping generations (OLG) model. However, empirical studies of ￿scal
policy e⁄ects do not support these models. In particular, the link between ￿scal policy
and private consumption seems to contradict the empirical predictions. Boskin (1988)
and Poterba (1988), for instance, conclude that the impact of tax cuts on consump-
tion is much larger than the neutral (or the very small) e⁄ect predicted by a life-cycle
or permanent-income model. Similarly, Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2002)
and Gal￿ et al. (2003) estimate a signi￿cant positive relationship between government
spending and private consumption.1 This is also di¢ cult to reconcile with standard
forward-looking models.
Boskin, Gal￿ et al. and Poterba suggest that myopic ￿rule-of-thumb￿behavior by
households is a likely explanation of their empirical results.2 The traditional Keynesian
IS-LM-type model incorporates myopia because consumers only care about current in-
come when making consumption decisions. However, the empirical studies referred to
give little support to this model. The response of private consumption to tax cuts is
substantially lower than that predicted by a standard Keynesian model. The estimates
in Boskin (1988) suggest that the e⁄ects of tax cuts on consumption are ￿only one-third
as large as the typical Keynesian estimate ...￿(p. 401). Moreover, Perotti (2002) ￿nds
small e⁄ects of ￿scal policy on GDP in ￿ve OECD countries. He ￿nds a positive link
between government spending and output, but the multipliers are generally less than
unity. Perotti ￿nds even smaller e⁄ects of tax cuts on GDP; his benchmark results
indicate negative e⁄ects of tax cuts on GDP in Australia, Germany and the UK.3
In this paper, we present a model of a small open economy that can account for these
stylized empirical observations. Our framework is based on Mankiw￿ s (2000) proposi-
tion that ￿scal policy should be analyzed in the context of simple microeconomic het-
erogeneity in the form of savers and spenders.4 Savers have long time horizons and
smooth consumption from year-to-year and generation-to-generation, whereas spenders
adopt the rule-of-thumb of consuming their disposable income in every period.5 Several
1The studies referred to are based on US data, except that of Perotti (2002). Perotti analyzes data
from Australia, Canada, Germany and the UK, in addition to the US.
2One can interpret rule-of-thumb behavior as a result of either credit-market imperfections in the
form of borrowing constraints, or as a deviation from full rationality. Thaler (1992, p. 120) refers to ￿...
two important sources of liquidity constraints: those imposed by capital markets, and those imposed by
individuals on themselves.￿
3Note however that Perotti ￿nds the latter results ￿suspicious￿(p. 24). He nevertheless concludes
that the positive e⁄ects of tax cuts on GDP obtained by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) for the US are
at ￿the high end of the spectrum￿(p. 25) among OECD countries.
4Poterba (1988) also implicitly suggests that a framework with myopic and forward-looking agents
could explain the empirical link between tax changes and consumption: ￿Myopia, if part of the explana-
tion, is clearly not universal. There are obvious cases ... that suggest a substantial number of tax payers
are responsive to preannounced changes in policy. The existence of such taxpayers, however, does not
disprove of others who fail to look ahead.￿(p. 417).
5Mankiw￿ s argument for this heterogeneity is based on facts about consumption behavior. On the
2recent papers demonstrate that the inclusion of this simple heterogeneity in macroeco-
nomic models provides important insights into the e⁄ects of macro-policies. Amato and
Laubach (2003) and Gal￿ et al. (2004) analyze monetary policy with rule-of-thumb be-
havior, and Mankiw (2000) and Gal￿ et al. (2003) explore the implications of ￿scal policy
in closed economies.6
The introduction of openness into a spenders-savers framework provides new channels
for ￿scal policy that operate through real exchange rates and current account dynamics.
We show that this challenges some closed-economy results, and importantly, that our
results are consistent with the stylized facts of ￿scal policy discussed above. First, in an
open economy, tax cuts stimulate private consumption, but￿ in line with Perotti￿ s (2002)
￿ndings￿ have a negative e⁄ect on output. Thus, unlike in the closed- economy model of
Mankiw (2000), tax cuts are not necessarily expansionary when some consumers behave
in a ￿Keynesian￿fashion (by consuming labor income).
Second, like Gal￿ et al. (2003), we ￿nd that increased government spending can
increase private consumption. However, Gal￿ et al. (2003, p. 3) argue that ￿... the
coexistence of sticky prices and rule-of-thumb consumers is a necessary condition for an
increase in government spending to raise aggregate consumption.￿While this may be
the case in a closed economy, we show that imposing sticky prices is not necessary for
increased public spending to increase consumption in an open economy. The reason is
that spenders a⁄ect the path for the real exchange rate, and rational forward-looking
savers take this into account. In closed-economy models, such e⁄ects are assumed away.
We discuss the circumstances under which the response from savers either magni￿es or
dampens the response of spenders.
Our framework is most closely related to the early closed-economy models with
spenders and savers, but is also related to other open-economy models. In particu-
lar, our analysis is closely related to the Dornbusch (1983) model of the equilibrium
real interest rate in a small open economy. Assuming exogenous production, Dornbusch
showed that the relevant interest rate facing domestic agents in such an economy is
the world interest rate adjusted for intertemporal changes in the relative price of home
goods. Our model allows for non-separable utility in consumption and leisure combined
with endogenous production. In this case, we show that the relevant interest rate facing
domestic savers is Dornbusch￿ s interest rate adjusted for intertemporal changes in the
wage rate. The Dornbusch interest rate is a special case in our model.
Another closely related paper is Persson￿ s (1985) analysis of budget de￿cits and
one hand, aggregate consumer spending follows current aggregate income far more closely than is sug-
gested by forward-looking theories (see, e.g., Campbell and Mankiw, 1991), and micro-data reveals that
many households hardly save at all (see, e.g., Wol⁄, 1998), which suggests that they cannot smooth
consumption over time.
On the other hand, some consumers seem to have long time horizons. Mankiw reports, for instance,
that while the top ￿ve percent of people in the US income distribution earn 15-20 percent of total income,
they hold 72 percent of the economy￿ s ￿nancial wealth. Such wealth accumulation suggests that motives
such as bequests may be important, which implies that some households have long time horizons.
6The empirical importance of spenders is documented in a series of papers by Campbell and Mankiw
(1989, 1990, 1991). They estimate that about half of US income is earned by rule-of-thumb consumers.
Similar results have been obtained for other countries by other researchers.
3public debt in open OLG models. He focuses on intergenerational welfare distributions of
public debt, whereas we concentrate on short-run e⁄ects on relative prices and economic
activity. Moreover, labor supply responses play an important role in our model, while
labor supply is exogenous in Persson￿ s paper.
We show how the interaction between heterogeneity, openness and labor supply deter-
mines real exchange-rate dynamics. Although our model incorporates constant returns
to scale in production, taxes and public spending a⁄ect both short- and long-run real
exchange rates. Due to the role of spenders, higher current transfers, for instance, raise
labor demand and lower labor supply. Therefore, the short-run real exchange rate ap-
preciates. However, in the long run, the real exchange rate must depreciate to below its
initial level. This is because current higher transfers and demand must be met by lower
future transfers and demand (unless savers completely counteract them, which does not
occur in our model) and higher future labor supply. Thus, not only does the short-run
real exchange rate overshoot its long-run value, it also moves in the opposite direction.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop a small open-economy
model with savers and spenders. In section 3, we brie￿ y describe the market for do-
mestically produced goods. In section 4, we describe the stationary equilibrium of the
model. In section 5, which is the main section of the paper, we analyze the e⁄ect of
di⁄erent ￿scal policies. Section 6 concludes the paper. Some derivations and a proof are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 A small open economy with savers and spenders
We consider a small open economy that is inhabited by two types of household. In the
spirit of Mankiw (2000), we denote them as savers and spenders, respectively. Savers are
fully rational intertemporal maximizers, whereas spenders consume their entire after-tax
labor income in every period. In addition, we follow Gal￿ and Monacelli (2004) and model
a continuum of small open economies indexed on the unit interval. Hence, each country
is su¢ ciently small to have negligible e⁄ects on output, prices and the interest rate in
other economies within the world economy. This enables us to treat all foreign variables
as exogenous. Each economy comprises households, perfectly competitive ￿rms and a
￿scal authority. Di⁄erent countries share the same technology, preferences and market
structures, but are subject to idiosyncratic changes in ￿scal policy. We next describe a
typical small open economy, the home country, in detail.
2.1 Households
2.1.1 Savers
A fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of households has access to an international ￿nancial market where






where the parameter ￿ is the time discount factor and u(cs;ls) is period s utility, which
depends on the amount of leisure, l, and consumption c. In what follows, we apply the













The parameter ￿ > 0 denotes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of utility and







￿￿￿1. This elasticity equals ￿ when ￿ = 1 and is equal to unity when
￿ = 1. Consumption and leisure are substitutes in utility if ￿ < 1 and are complements
otherwise.
Consumption is de￿ned as a Cobb￿ Douglas aggregate over domestic goods (cH) and




where ￿ 2 (0;1) and the constant K ￿ 1=￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿ is included to simplify some of





where ci;s denotes the domestic consumption of goods produced in country i 2 [0;1] in
period s. Hence, we assume a unit elasticity of substitution between di⁄erent imported
goods. We adopt the basket of foreign goods as the numeraire, and since all domestic
agents take its price as given, we can normalize its price to unity.




ci;spi;sdi + e Qs+1 = (1 + r) e Qs + Wsns + Ts; (5)
where ps and pi;s, respectively, are the relative prices of domestic goods and goods
from country i in period s. Both are expressed in terms of the basket of foreign goods.
Moreover, e Qt denotes the stock of foreign assets held by domestic savers at the beginning
of period t, and ns ￿ 1￿ls is hours worked, while Ws and Ts are the wage rate and net
lump-sum transfers, respectively, both of which are measured in terms of foreign goods.
Since we use foreign goods as the numeraire, the interest rate in (5) can be interpreted
as the own-interest rate on foreign goods. Foreign assets are therefore bonds that yield
a return of r e Q units of foreign goods per period.
7Savers are also subject to the ￿No-Ponzi game￿transversality condition.




for all i 2 [0;1]. Likewise, the optimal allocation between domestic and imported goods
implies:
cH;s = (1 ￿ ￿)p￿￿
s cs; cF;s = ￿p1￿￿
s cs; (7)
where the consumer price index is given by:8
Ps ￿ p1￿￿
s : (8)
The ￿rst-order conditions in (7) imply that the demand for each good is proportional to
real consumption, with proportionality factors given by the relative prices. Note that, as
in Gal￿ and Monacelli (2004), the parameter ￿ is a natural measure of openness because
1 ￿ ￿ measures the extent of home bias in consumption.
For future reference, note that the identity for ￿nancial asset accumulation by savers
is:
e Qs+1 ￿ e Qs = r e Qs + Wsns + Ts ￿ Pscs: (9)














(Ws + Ts); (10)
for which we have used the ￿No-Ponzi-game￿ transversality condition. The optimal









Equation (11) indicates how, in every period s, leisure depends on the current consumer
real wage (Ws
Ps ) (henceforth, the real wage) and consumption. Labor supply is increasing
in the real wage and is decreasing in real consumption.
The ￿nal ￿rst-order condition for savers is the Euler equation for consumption:










Besides the usual e⁄ects of the interest rate and discount rate, the consumption growth
of savers depends on the rate of real wage growth (unless ￿ = 1) and on the rate of change
in the price level. For given real wage growth, an increase in the rate of CPI in￿ ation
(Ps+1=Ps) lowers consumption growth; this represents the Dornbusch (1983) e⁄ect. The
partial e⁄ect of a change in real wage growth is ambiguous because it depends on whether
8This equation applies because spenders make the same intratemporal allocations as do savers; see
below.
6￿ 7 1. Consider an increase in the growth rate of real wages (due, for example, to higher
anticipated future wages). This stimulates savers￿consumption growth when ￿ < 1.
This e⁄ect is due to one intertemporal response and one intratemporal response. Both
responses are related to the induced increase in future labor supply that is due to the
wage increase. The ￿rst arises because when ￿ < 1, savers are unwilling to substitute
utility over time and they counteract the fall in utility that is due to higher future
work hours by increasing future consumption. The second arises because c and l are
substitutes when ￿ < 1 [ @2u
@c@l < 0]. Hence, lower future leisure raises the marginal utility
of future consumption and thereby contributes to higher future consumption (relative
to current consumption). When ￿ > 1, the explanation is analogous. Savers would be
willing to substitute utility over time, and c and l would be complements. Therefore, the
consumption growth of savers would fall were the growth rate of real wages to increase.
With log utility (￿ = 1), consumption and leisure enter utility separably and changes in
real wage growth have no e⁄ect on savers￿consumption growth.
2.1.2 Spenders
The remaining share, ￿, of households does not save, but instead spends the disposable
income in every period. Mankiw (2000) discusses the reasons for such rule-of-thumb
behavior.














t + Tt: (13)
where the prime denotes the consumption and labor supply of spenders, as opposed to
savers. We assume that spenders have a period utility function that is analogous to
(2), a Cobb￿ Douglas aggregator for domestic and foreign consumption as in (3), and
an aggregator of foreign goods, as in (4). It follows that spenders￿static allocations
between di⁄erent imported goods and between domestic and foreign goods are described
by a ￿rst-order condition that is analogous to (6) and (7), respectively. Likewise, the
choice between leisure and consumption for these households is determined by a ￿rst-
order condition that is analogous to (11). By combining this with (13), we can express
spenders￿labor supply as:
n0
t = ￿ ￿
Tt
Wt
(1 ￿ ￿): (14)
In the absence of transfers, the proportion of their time that spenders allocate to the
labor market equals the weight on consumption in the utility function. Positive transfers
reduce their labor supply. By substituting the labor-supply equation into (13), we can








72.1.3 Aggregate consumption and labor supply
Total consumption demand and the supply of hours in the economy are weighted averages
of these variables for the two household groups:
Ct ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)ct + ￿c0
t (16)
Nt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)nt + ￿n0
t: (17)
The determination of these variables is explained in the equilibrium analysis below.
2.2 Firms
Firms operate under perfect competition and have access to linear technology represented
by Yt = Nt. Pro￿t maximization implies:
ps = Ws: (18)
In every period, the price of the domestic good is equal to the wage rate, and both are
measured in terms of the foreign good.
2.3 The government
The ￿scal authority determines net transfers in every period, and thus transfers are
exogenous in our model. For simplicity, we initially disregard government consumption.
An analysis of government spending is provided in section 5.2 below. In the same way
as private savers, the government can borrow and lend abroad at an exogenous interest






t denotes the government￿ s net foreign assets at the beginning of period t in








Ts = (1 + r)QG
t : (19)
The present discounted value of transfers must equal the government￿ s net assets (in-
cluding asset income).







Pscs = (1 + r)
￿











This constraint demonstrates that savers are Ricardian in the accepted sense: they
fully internalize their share of government wealth into their asset holdings when making
consumption decisions. Moreover, transfers do not enter their budget constraint, and
8hence do not directly a⁄ect their consumption decisions. However, we show subsequently
that the timing of transfers does a⁄ect relative prices, and therefore wages and the
aggregate price level, which in turn a⁄ect savers￿consumption. We should also note
that the term e Qt + QG
t in (20) di⁄ers from that representing the whole economy￿ s net
foreign-asset position. Total foreign-asset holdings are given by:
Qt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) e Qt + QG
t : (21)
2.4 The rest of the world
The world economy is made up of small open economies as explained above, and there-
fore, ￿rst-order conditions for savers and spenders analogous to those for the domestic
economy apply to each country i. Moreover, we assume, without loss of generality, that
net transfers in the rest of the world are zero in every period; that is, Ti;s = 0 8i;s.
We also assume that the distribution of savers and spenders is the same in every coun-
try (except possibly the domestic economy), and that initial conditions (except in the
domestic economy, which has a measure of zero in the world economy) are symmetric.
These assumptions imply that in the domestic economy, the prices of imported goods
are independent of their country of origin, and hence, their relative prices are unity.
Therefore, ci;s = cF;s 8i. Note that the normalization of a unitary price of the basket of
foreign goods implies that the common price of imports is unity. This implies that the
CPI of all countries other than the home country has a constant value of unity.
Denoting world-economy variables using an asterisk, and integrating over all coun-













s = ￿: (24)
In addition, due to symmetry and since the current account is the only means of saving
in each country, the real interest rate must be such that savings are zero for every period.
Hence, we have:
1 + r = ￿￿1: (25)
Consumption and labor supply in the world economy are therefore:
N￿
s = C￿
s = ￿: (26)
2.5 The real exchange rate, the terms of trade and the real interest
rate
Before analyzing the equilibrium and the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy in this model, it is useful
to explain how the relative price of domestic goods determines the real exchange rate,
the terms of trade and the real interest rate. Given (8), the e⁄ective real exchange rate
9is simply p￿￿1
s in period s, while the e⁄ective terms of trade (i.e., the price of exports in
terms of imports) is ps. An increase in the relative price leads to a real exchange rate
appreciation and an improvement in the terms of trade.
To de￿ne the real interest rate in this economy, we note that (8) and (18) imply that


































The ￿rst term on the right-hand side is equal to the consumption-based interest rate in
Dornbusch (1983). Whenever the relative price is expected to increase (decrease) over
time, this term contributes to lower (raise) the e⁄ective real interest rate. However, in
the present model, this e⁄ect is augmented by the e⁄ect represented by the ￿nal term
in the latter expression. This term arises because of the endogenous labor supply in our
model. (It can be written as (Ws=Ws+1)
￿(1￿￿)(￿￿1)=￿.) When ￿ < 1, this term raises
the real interest rate when wages are increasing, thereby counteracting the ￿Dornbusch
e⁄ect￿on the real interest rate. When ￿ > 1, the Dornbusch e⁄ect is reinforced. When
￿ = 1, the usual borderline case, in which labor supply decisions do not interact with the
consumption-based real interest rate, arises. In this special case, the consumption-based
interest rate is the same as that in Dornbusch (1983). Note also that if relative prices
are constant, i.e., if ps+1 = ps, the consumption-based interest rate is equal to the world
interest rate r.
3 The market for the domestic good
3.1 Demand and supply of the domestic good
The demand for the domestically produced good can be expressed in terms of its relative
price and aggregate domestic consumption:
CH;s + C￿
H;s = (1 ￿ ￿)p￿￿
s Cs + ￿p￿1
s ￿: (28)
This expression follows from (6), (7), the analogous foreign relationships, and (26). The
￿rst term on the right-hand side represents domestic demand for the home good, while
the second term represents foreign demand (i.e., exports). Both are negatively related
to the relative price of the domestic good.
The supply of the domestically produced good can be expressed as:





10where the ￿rst equality is the production function and the second follows from equilib-
rium in the labor market and labor supply from equation (11) (and the corresponding
￿rst-order condition for spenders).
Market clearing in the market for the domestic good yields an implicit relationship
















s ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿￿p￿￿2
s
> 0: (31)
The relative price of the domestic good is increasing in aggregate domestic consumption.
3.2 The current account and net exports
The current account is the di⁄erence between total income and domestic consumption:
Qs+1 ￿ Qs ￿ CAs = rQs + psYs ￿ psCH;s ￿ CF;s ￿ rQs + TBs; (32)
where TBs is the trade balance in period s, measured in terms of foreign goods. We
combine the demand functions in (7) with equation (29) to express the trade balance in
period s as:










(1 ￿ ps): (33)
An increase in the relative price of the domestic good, and hence, a real appreciation of
the exchange rate, leads to a deterioration in the trade balance.
4 The stationary equilibrium
To discuss ￿scal policy, it is reasonable to begin with the stationary equilibrium. In a
stationary equilibrium, the relative price and net transfers are anticipated to be constant
over time. Suppose that the small economy is in a stationary equilibrium in period t,
so that the relative price is anticipated to remain constant at p = pt and transfers are
expected to be at the constant level T = Tt.
In the appendix, we derive a general consumption function for domestic savers; see
equation (A.1). With a constant relative price p in the stationary equilibrium, this
consumption function reduces to:
cs = c = ￿
 
r( e Qt + QG




11Given (11), constant consumption implies constant labor supply, as follows:
ns = n = ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)r
￿














e Qt + QG
t
￿
= p1￿￿c ￿ r
￿










Savers￿consumption in the stationary equilibrium is equal to the real value of their labor
income plus the permanent income of their consolidated net foreign assets.
With regard to spenders￿stationary consumption, ￿rst note that, from (19), constant
transfers imply:
Ts = T = rQG
t ; 8s:
By substituting this into (15), we ￿nd the stationary consumption of spenders:
c0







Only the government￿ s asset position is relevant to spenders because spenders do not
accumulate assets themselves. A high-wealth government permits high stationary trans-
fers, and this increases spenders￿consumption. Similarly, government assets in￿ uence
spenders￿labor supply negatively in the stationary equilibrium, as follows:
n0
s = n0 = ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)rQG
t =W; 8s:
Aggregate labor supply and output in the stationary equilibrium can now be written
as:
Y = N = ￿
￿





+ (1 ￿ ￿)
"
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)








The last equality makes use of the de￿nition of total foreign assets (21). The higher is
aggregate ￿nancial wealth and the more important is leisure in generating utility, the
lower is aggregate labor supply and output in the stationary equilibrium. Note that
aggregate labor income is:
WN = ￿W ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)rQt:









12The second equality follows from the expression for aggregate labor income above. In the
stationary equilibrium, aggregate consumption is equal to real aggregate labor income
plus real permanent income from total foreign assets. Note that the distribution of
households between savers and spenders has no e⁄ect on consumption and output in the
stationary equilibrium. Given the stationary transfer policy of the government, total
consumption is equal to aggregate income (including asset income) for both savers and
spenders.
Next, consider the relative price of domestic goods. We use (38) in (30) to express
the relative price of the domestic good in the stationary equilibrium as follows:




The stationary equilibrium price is higher the higher the country￿ s net foreign-asset
holdings (and hence the real exchange rate is ￿stronger￿ and the terms of trade are
better). With zero net initial foreign-asset holdings, as for the other countries in the
world economy, the relative price of domestic goods would be unity in the stationary
equilibrium. For a given positive level of foreign assets in stationary equilibrium, the
relative price is lower the more open is the economy, and the less important is leisure in
generating utility (i.e., the higher is labor supply).
Finally in this section, we use (39) in (33) to demonstrate that TB = ￿rQt in the
stationary equilibrium. The small economy runs a trade de￿cit (surplus) equal to its
income from foreign assets (debt). Thus, the current account is zero in the stationary
equilibrium.
5 Fiscal policy
In this section, we analyze ￿scal policy in the presence of savers and spenders. Two
types of ￿scal experiments are considered. The ￿rst is a ￿Ricardian￿ -type experiment in
which the government lowers taxes (increases transfers) in one period, and then increases
taxes to a constant level in the following period. In the second experiment, we analyze
the e⁄ects of a one-period increase in government spending.
To simplify notation, we assume that both savers and the government initially have
no foreign assets ( e Qt = QG
t = 0). This implies that the ex ante stationary equilibrium
price is p = 1.
5.1 A transitory tax cut
Suppose that instead of holding transfers ￿xed at T = rQG
t = 0, as in the ex ante
stationary equilibrium, the government increases transfers (cuts taxes) to Tt = TH > 0
and then reduces transfers to a new permanent level TL in period t+1, such that Ts = TL
8s > t. From (19), it follows that:
TL = ￿rTH < 0: (40)
13That is, the permanent level of taxes, from period t+1, is equal to interest payments on
the foreign borrowing necessary to ￿nance the period t tax cut. Note that, under this
policy, the level of public debt, QG
t+1 = ￿TH, is constant from t + 1.
From period t+1, the economy is again in a stationary equilibrium, and has adjusted
to the new lower level of permanent transfers. Hence, the results derived in section 4
apply. In particular, equation (39) implies:
ps = pt+1 = 1 +
1 ￿ ￿￿
￿￿
rQt+1; 8s > t:
To show how the new stationary equilibrium price relates to the price in period t, we use
the current account equation, (32), and the equilibrium trade balance, (33), to substitute
for Qt+1. This substitution yields:








Given (39), the term in square brackets is the relative price that would have prevailed
without the change in ￿scal policy (i.e., the price in the ex ante stationary equilibrium).
Thus, we have:
pt+1 = (1 + r)p ￿ rpt = 1 + r ￿ rpt: (41)
Proposition 1 If a transitory change in taxes or transfers generates a ￿rst-period in-
crease (decrease) in the relative price of domestic goods, the relative price must fall (rise)
in the second period. Relative to the ex ante stationary equilibrium, the new stationary
equilibrium (from period t + 1 onwards) is characterized by a lower relative price if the
price increases in the ￿rst period, and by a higher relative price if the price falls in the
￿rst period.
In the rest of this subsection, we ￿rst discuss the e⁄ects that occur in the ￿rst period
following the change in policy (the ￿transition￿period). Then, we analyze the properties
of the new stationary equilibrium that prevails from period t + 1.
5.1.1 Short-run e⁄ects of a temporary tax cut
Observe ￿rst that, given a constant price from t + 1, the period t consumption function
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By using (41) and e Qt = QG
t = 0, savers￿consumption in period t can be expressed as a













14Together with the consumption function for spenders (15), this expression provides the
￿rst important result of this subsection:
Proposition 2 When some households are spenders, a temporary tax cut triggers a
short-run increase in the relative price of domestic goods (i.e., an initial period real
exchange rate appreciation).
Proof. See Section B in the Appendix.





1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿ (￿ ￿ 1)]A
; (43)
where A > 0 is de￿ned in the appendix. Note that spenders are necessary and su¢ cient
for there to be a ￿rst-period price increase. Without spenders, the model would be fully
Ricardian and transitory tax cuts would have no real e⁄ect.
Note further that the price response is not simply a weighted average of responses
from two separate models, one with only spenders and one with only savers. The reason is
simple: savers rationally react to the appreciation induced by rule-of-thumb consumers.
Therefore, the short-run price increase is greater (smaller) if ￿ is less than (greater
than) unity. When c and l are substitutes (￿ < 1), increased labor supply due to higher
real wages contributes to increased consumption by savers, which magni￿es the price
response. The opposite applies when c and l are complements.
For completeness, we note that the increase in p in period t produces contemporary
increases in the CPI (p1￿￿), the nominal wage (p) and the real wage (p￿).
The next proposition summarizes the e⁄ects on consumption.
Proposition 3 In the short run, a temporary tax cut (i) increases aggregate consump-
tion and (ii) increases consumption by spenders, but (iii) has an ambiguous impact on
consumption by savers.













From (15), ex ante consumption by savers is ￿ (recall that ex ante, p = 1 and T = 0), and







. Hence, we have result (ii). Ex ante consumption






. Comparing this to (42) reveals that ct < c
if ￿ ￿ 1, but otherwise, the e⁄ect is ambiguous. This demonstrates result (iii).
Note ￿rst that aggregate consumption unambiguously increases following a tax cut
when there are spenders. Thus, the results obtained by Boskin (1988), Poterba (1988)
and Blanchard and Perotti (2002) hold in our model. However, our model provides
a possible explanation of the empirical ￿nding highlighted by these authors that the
15e⁄ect is typically less than the one predicted by Keynesian models. In our model, the
quantitative e⁄ect depends not only on the composition of savers and spenders in the
economy, but also on the interplay between the two groups:
The tax cut has an expansionary e⁄ect on spenders￿consumption because of both
the transfer itself and the induced increase in real wages. For savers, only the induced
price e⁄ect matters. However, the relationship between this e⁄ect and the consumption
decisions of savers is rather complex. A temporary increase in the CPI tends to lower
consumption. When ￿ = 1, only this e⁄ect operates. If ￿ > 1, this e⁄ect is reinforced by
complementarity between c and l; higher labor supply in period t contributes to lower
consumption. When ￿ < 1, savers seek to compensate their utility loss due to working
more hours by increasing contemporary consumption. This counteracts the negative
response of consumption to the increase in the CPI, and makes the overall response of
consumption by savers ambiguous.
Thus, although the positive consumption response of spenders raises the price, the
consumption response of savers is not necessarily negative. On the one hand, domestic
goods are temporarily more expensive, which motivates savers to postpone consump-
tion. However, on the other hand, wages are high, and higher labor supply and lower
leisure can be compensated by higher consumption. If the latter e⁄ect dominates, the
consumption response of savers magni￿es the response of the spenders: ￿irrational￿
responses invite rational responses in the same direction.
The expansionary e⁄ect on Ct is greater the more households value consumption
relative to leisure (i.e., the higher is ￿). It is also greater the more open is the economy
(the larger is ￿). This is because, for a given increase in the relative price, the CPI
increase is smaller the higher is ￿, while the real wage increase is greater the higher is ￿
Perotti￿ s (2002) empirical ￿nding that the short-term response of production to tax
cuts is negative in several countries seems counterintuitive in the context of tax cuts
increasing total demand. However, the contractionary e⁄ect of a tax cut on domestic
production is predicted by our model, as the following proposition makes clear.
Proposition 4 A transitory tax cut reduces contemporary demand for domestic goods.



































The ￿rst two terms on the right-hand side of (45) are negative. They represent
expenditure switching (due to the higher price) away from domestic goods by domestic
16and foreign consumers, respectively. The ￿nal term is positive and represents the e⁄ect
on the demand for domestic goods due to higher aggregate consumption. Despite the
stimulus to aggregate consumption, the net e⁄ect on the demand for domestic goods is
unambiguously negative, as indicated by (46).
To understand the intuition behind this result, note that in equilibrium, the reduction
in the demand for domestic goods is matched by a fall in production. Hence, the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 A temporary tax cut leads to an initial reduction in equilibrium aggregate
labor supply.
Proof. Di⁄erentiating (29) with respect to Tt and substituting from (30) and (44)
reveals that dNt=dTt is equal to the right-hand side of (46).
It may be somewhat counterintuitive that equilibrium labor supply unambiguously
falls when the real wage increases (recall that the real wage is p￿
t ). To understand this,
assume that there are only spenders (￿ = 1). When spenders￿disposable income in-
creases due to the tax cut, they want to consume more and work less. Both responses
raise the price and the real wage. The induced price e⁄ect limits, but does not com-
pletely reverse, the reduction in labor supply. Thus, we obtain the surprising result
that in an open economy with purely Keynesian consumers, a tax cut has a short-term
contractionary e⁄ect on output. This result emerges because, unlike most other models
with Keynesian consumers, ours includes endogenous labor supply.
The response of savers￿net labor supply depends on whether c and l are comple-
ments or substitutes. However, as Proposition 4 demonstrates, the overall e⁄ect of a
temporary tax cut is an initial decline in labor supply and production. Furthermore,
since production falls while consumption increases, the temporary tax cut generates a
trade de￿cit in period t.
Our results di⁄er from those in Mankiw (2000), in which the incorporation of spenders
means that temporary tax cuts have large positive e⁄ects on demand. Our contrary re-
sult can be understood on the basis of three main di⁄erences with Mankiw￿ s model.
First, Mankiw develops a closed-economy model, and therefore, increases in aggregate
consumption are the same as increases in domestic consumption. In our open-economy
model, by contrast, the real exchange-rate appreciation leads to substitution towards
foreign goods (by both domestic and foreign households). Therefore, domestic consump-
tion may increase even though the production of domestically produced goods decreases.
Second, in Mankiw￿ s model, savers do not adjust their consumption patterns when taxes
change because there is no e⁄ect on (relative) prices. In our model, by contrast, relative
price changes also induce savers to respond to tax cuts. Third, labor supply is negatively
a⁄ected by increased transfers in our model, whereas this e⁄ect is absent from Mankiw￿ s
analysis.
Gal￿ et al. (2003) model endogenous labor supply in a framework with savers and
spenders, but they do not study the e⁄ects of temporary tax cuts. However, it is easy to
deduce that their model would imply an increase in production, provided monetary policy
did not fully stabilize the e⁄ect. The source of this e⁄ect is sticky prices, which would
17temporarily allow for an increase in real wages and a fall in ￿rms￿pro￿ts. Households
would therefore be willing to supply more labor, which would be needed to increase
production. In the absence of sticky prices, Gal￿ et al.￿ s model would imply no change in
production. The price level would be determined as a mark-up over nominal wages (and
therefore, the real wage would also be determined). Therefore, given the labor-supply
schedules of households, a joint increase in consumption (and consequently production)
and labor supply (up to a ￿rst-order approximation to the equilibrium dynamics) is not
possible. Hence, the increase in consumption demand from spenders is exactly o⁄set by
a decrease in demand from savers.
5.1.2 The new stationary equilibrium
In period t+1, the economy reaches its new stationary equilibrium. As discussed above,
this is characterized by a constant level of taxes, TL = ￿rTH, and a constant level of
government debt, QG
t+1 = ￿TH.
A corollary of Propositions 1 and 2 is that the relative price pt+1 is below both the
period t price pt, and the ex ante stationary price. To express this in terms of the
real exchange rate, the tax cut leads to an appreciation in the ￿rst period, followed
by a depreciation to a new stationary equilibrium in the second period. Moreover,
the depreciation is such that the real exchange rate falls below the initial stationary
equilibrium value. Hence, the real exchange rate not only overshoots its long-run value,
it also moves in the opposite direction. Since the relative price is less than unity from
period t + 1 onwards, it follows from (39) that the economy has aggregate net foreign
debt (Qt+1 < 0) in the new stationary equilibrium. Thus, to the extent that savers do
accumulate foreign assets in period t, their asset accumulation is less than government
borrowing in that period.
These observations are su¢ cient to determine the e⁄ects on the stationary equi-
librium values for the aggregate variables in the model, which are summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 5 In the long run, a transitory tax cut leads to lower aggregate consump-
tion, but higher labor supply and higher demand for domestic goods.
No formal proof is necessary to validate this proposition. Simply recall that in the
ex ante stationary equilibrium, C = N = (CH + C￿
H) = ￿. Hence, it follows from (38)
that Ct+1 < C. Lower real wages and lower net foreign debt both contribute to lower
consumption. Similarly, Nt+1 > N follows from (37). In aggregate, the households of
the economy work harder to pay o⁄ interest on their foreign debt. In equilibrium, the
increase in the production of domestic goods is matched by an increase in demand. A
lower relative price of domestic goods generates expenditure switching towards those
goods, and the fall in domestic aggregate consumption does not completely counteract
this e⁄ect. The full dynamic e⁄ects of a transitory tax cut on the model￿ s aggregate
variables can be summarized as follows: (a) Ct > C > Ct+1, (b) Yt+1 > Y > Yt, and (c)
(CH + C￿
H)t+1 > CH + C￿
H > (CH + C￿
H)t.
18For spenders, the long-run e⁄ects of the policy are relatively straightforward. Equa-
tion (36) reveals that c0
t+1 < c, because of negative transfers and lower real wages in
the new stationary equilibrium. However, spenders increase their labor supply; see (14).
Hence, the e⁄ects of the temporary tax cut on spenders are as follows: c0
t > c0 > c0
t+1
and n0
t+1 > n0 > n0
t.
For savers, there are few unambiguous e⁄ects for arbitrary values of ￿. However,
some important implications of heterogeneity can be determined by considering the
special case of log utility (￿ = 1). Therefore, for the remainder of this subsection, we
impose this assumption. Proposition 3 above shows that log utility implies a short-run
decrease in real consumption for savers. Moreover, when ￿ = 1, it follows from the Euler
equation (27) that ct+1 > ct: To compare the ex ante and new stationary equilibria, we
￿rst note that, when ￿ = 1, equation (B.2) in the appendix provides the following exact
expression for the relative price in period t:
ptj￿=1 = 1 +
￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)
TH:
This expression and the consumption function (42) in (9) imply that:
e Qt+1j￿=1 =
1
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)
TH:
Note how spenders a⁄ect the wealth accumulation of savers. When ￿ = 0, households
simply save period t￿ s tax cut to smooth consumption. However, with spenders, the tax
cut produces a temporary price increase that raises the consumption-based real interest
rate (since ￿ = 1) that savers face. Each individual saver responds by accumulating
more wealth than is implied by a pure Ricardian model.9
The previous expression and (41) in (A.1) implies that real consumption by savers in
the new stationary equilibrium could be higher or lower than in the ex ante stationary
equilibrium. Like those of spenders, savers￿real wages fall from period t + 1, but unlike
spenders, savers receive net asset income in the new stationary equilibrium. The log-
utility function implies that consumption paths such that ct+1 > c > ct or such that
c > ct+1 > ct are both possible for savers following a transitory tax cut.
We can use our model to discuss the distributional e⁄ects of ￿scal policy. Consider
the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Transitory tax cuts increase long-run inequality.
This result follows from the stationary equilibrium consumption functions for savers












accumulates more assets than is predicted by a Ricardian model, but total private asset accumulation is
below the government￿ s debt accumulation.
19This expression is clearly positive when ￿ = 1. The transitory tax cut creates incen-
tives for spenders to accumulate ￿nancial assets, and since spenders do not save, this
creates inequality in stationary equilibrium consumption. Since both types of house-
hold consume their disposable income in the stationary equilibrium, the inequality in
consumption is equivalent to long-run income inequality.
5.2 Public spending
So far, we have ignored public spending. However, in theory (and reality) the e⁄ects
of changes in public spending may be quite di⁄erent from those of tax changes. Ri-
cardian models, for instance, predict no real e⁄ects of changes in lump-sum taxes, but
they do imply that changes in public spending have real e⁄ects. (For example, higher
public spending typically reduces consumption according to standard forward-looking
models.) We explore the e⁄ects of a one-period public spending increase. It transpires
that the open-economy model with savers and spenders yields novel insights, not only
when compared to standard models, but also when compared to closed-economy models
with savers and spenders.
5.2.1 Incorporating public spending into the model
We make three assumptions. First, we restrict our attention to the log-utility model,
in which ￿ = 1. Second, the government consumes domestically produced goods only.
Third, private and public consumption a⁄ects the utility of private households sepa-
rately. The ￿rst two assumptions are arguably the least restrictive; we have already
discussed the types of e⁄ects that arise in the absence of a log-utility function, and by
focusing on government consumption of domestic goods, we analyze the type of public
consumption that has the richest e⁄ects because of the direct e⁄ect on domestic prices.
It is straightforward to incorporate the public consumption of foreign goods into the
analysis. Thus, we suggest that the third assumption is the most restrictive. The non-
separability of private and public consumption may introduce important e⁄ects of ￿scal
policy. However, the separability assumption makes it easier to explain why our results
di⁄er from other models that incorporate spenders and savers. Thus, in this section, we
opt for transparency at the cost of generality.
The incorporation of public spending into the model is straightforward. Let Gs be
public demand in period s. Since all demand is for domestic goods, the value of public
















Substitution into the budget constraint of savers yields the following modi￿ed general































For given prices, higher government spending lowers savers￿consumption. However,
prices change when G changes. Note that Gs ￿ 1 since the maximum possible production
of domestic goods in any given period is unity. (This occurs when both types of household
spend all their time working.)
When there is public consumption, aggregate demand for domestic goods in equation
(28) changes to:
CH;s + C￿
H;s + Gs = (1 ￿ ￿)p￿￿
s Cs + ￿￿p￿1
s + Gs:
Aggregate supply continues to be given by (29). Thus, the equilibrium relationship















[1 ￿ ps (1 ￿ Gs)]: (49)
Note that, for a given relative price, higher public spending improves the trade balance.
The reason is that government consumption crowds out savers￿consumption (for given
prices), and since the government demands only domestic goods, this improves the trade
balance. (However, again, prices change when G changes.)
5.2.2 A temporary increase in public spending
Without loss of generality, we assume that both G and T are zero in the ex ante sta-
tionary equilibrium. In period t, the government consumes the amount Gt of domestic
goods. The policy is ￿nanced by foreign borrowing (i.e., QG
t+1 = ￿ptGt), and by repaying
debt with constant taxes from period t + 1 onwards. The government￿ s intertemporal
budget constraint implies Ts = Tt+1 = ￿rptGt8s > t.
Since the economy again reaches the new stationary equilibrium in period t + 1,
equation (39) implies that pt+1 = 1 + rQt+1 (1 ￿ ￿￿)=￿￿ 8s > t. Therefore, the
current-account equation (32) and the trade balance equation (49) imply:
pt+1 = 1 + r ￿ rpt (1 ￿ Gt): (50)
Like for the tax cut already discussed, any change in the ￿rst-period relative price is
followed by an opposing change in the next period. Note also, however, that period
21t + 1￿ s reversal of the relative price is more modest than that of the tax cut. In that
case, dpt+1=dpt = ￿r, whereas in the current case, dpt+1=dpt = ￿r(1 ￿ Gt).
Next, we use the consumption functions of both households in (48) to ￿nd the e⁄ect
on the equilibrium price in period t:
pt =
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿) ￿ Gt
: (51)
This solution is meaningful only if pt is positive. Hence, we require Gt < 1￿￿(1 ￿ ￿￿).
Equation (51) implies that pt > 1. In other words, a temporary increase in public
spending leads to a contemporary real exchange-rate appreciation. Note that there is
an appreciation whatever the value of ￿. Unlike a cut in taxes, an increase in G leads
to a price increase also if there are only savers. However, the appreciation is greater the
higher the proportion of spenders. Note also that by using (51) in (50), we can show
that:
pt+1 = 1 ￿
r￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)Gt
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿) ￿ Gt
￿ 1:
When there are spenders, the relative price falls below the ex ante level in period t + 1.
If there are no spenders (￿ = 0), the real exchange rate depreciates to return to its ex
ante level in the new stationary equilibrium. Hence, pt > p ￿ pt+1 when there is a
temporary increase in G; equality applies when ￿ = 0.
The short-run consumption response is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 In the short run, a temporary increase in public spending (i) has an
ambiguous e⁄ect on aggregate consumption and (ii) increases consumption by spenders,
but (iii) it lowers consumption by savers.
Spenders increase consumption in period t because real wages increase. From (47)
(with ￿ = 1), consumption by savers falls in period t because of the temporary increase
in the price level. In contrast to our analysis of tax cuts, we cannot say anything
unambiguous about aggregate private consumption because the e⁄ects on Ct depend
on the proportion of savers. This is because increased public spending increases prices
even when there are no spenders, in which case, aggregate consumption falls. Thus,
the smaller the proportion of savers, the more likely is private consumption to increase
following an increase in public spending.
In the new stationary equilibrium, which is reached at t+1, spenders face a lower real
wage and must pay higher taxes. Therefore, consumption by spenders falls, relative to
both its level in period t and its ex ante level. Thus, for these households, c0
t > c0 > c0
t+1.
The consumption path for savers, on the other hand, is ambiguous when there are
spenders. The Euler equation (27) implies that ct+1 > ct because of the temporary
price increase in period t, but whether ct+1 is higher or lower than the ex ante level
is ambiguous. The reason is that, on the one hand, consumption increases since savers
accumulate ￿nancial wealth (taking into account their share of public debt) and thereby
yield net asset income from period t+1 onwards. However, on the other hand, consump-
tion decreases since they face a lower real wage. Interestingly, without spenders, ct+1
22would return to its ex ante level c. Recall that when ￿ = 0, the long-run relative price
is una⁄ected (relative to the ex ante level) by the increase in G. In addition, it can be
shown that there is no net asset accumulation by savers when ￿ = 0 (gross accumula-
tion is exactly equal to the government￿ s debt accumulation). This leaves the stationary
equilibrium consumption una⁄ected by the temporarily higher G. Thus, when ￿ = 0,
ct < c = ct+1.
Aggregate private consumption in the new stationary equilibrium, Ct+1, is lower than
its ex ante level, C, except when ￿ = 0. Spenders reduce consumption in period t + 1
and this reduction is only partially reversed by the consumption response of savers. As
in the case of the relationship between C and Ct+1the relationship between Ct and Ct+1
is ambiguous.
Note the contrast between our result and that of Gal￿ et al. (2003), who argue that the
presence of spenders is not su¢ cient for public spending to a⁄ect private consumption;
price rigidities are also necessary. While this may be the case in a closed-economy model,
it is not the case in an open-economy model, as we have shown. In their model, sticky
prices generate temporary changes in the real wage, while in our open-economy model,
(consumer) real wages may change in the absence of sticky prices because of changes in
the real exchange rate.
The e⁄ects on labor supply and domestic production are summarized by the following
proposition.
Proposition 8 A transitory increase in public spending leads to higher labor supply and
higher domestic production in both the short run and the long run.
Given savers￿period t consumption, ct = ￿p￿￿1
t , in (11) it can be shown that these
agents initially increase labor supply. This is a combined response to the ￿rst-period
increase in the real wage and the complementarity between c and l (recall the log utility
assumption). The labor supply of spenders in period t is una⁄ected by the increase
in Gt; see (14). There are o⁄setting income and substitution e⁄ects from the higher
real wage on the labor supply of spenders; the real wage increase makes leisure more
expensive, but it also makes spenders (feel) richer. With Cobb￿ Douglas preferences,
the two e⁄ects cancel each other out. Thus, in the aggregate, a temporary increase in
government expenditure leads to a contemporary increase in domestic labor supply and
production. Note that this is contrary to the short-run response to the tax cut, which
as we have already shown, generates an initial reduction in output. Note also that the
result is consistent with the empirical ￿ndings of, e.g., Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and
Perotti (2002).
It follows from the results in section 4 above that the labor supply of spenders
increases in the new stationary equilibrium, whereas it falls for savers. Spenders work
more because they have to pay permanently higher taxes, while each saver works less
because he or she has accumulated net ￿nancial assets in the ￿transition￿period. Hence,
when there is a transitory increase in public spending, the labor supply paths are nt >
n > nt+1 and n0
t+1 > n0
t = n0 for savers and spenders, respectively.
23To appreciate that the increased labor supply of spenders dominates in the aggregate,
note that (37) reveals that, relative to the ex ante situation, production is higher in the
new stationary equilibrium if the small open economy has negative net foreign assets.
Equations (9) and (51) imply that:
Qt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿) e Qt+1 + QG
t+1
= (1 ￿ ￿)(pt ￿ 1) ￿ ptGt
=
(1 ￿ ￿)Gt
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿) ￿ Gt
￿
[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)]Gt
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿) ￿ Gt
= ￿
￿￿￿Gt
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿) ￿ Gt
< 0:
Each saver accumulates net (consolidated) assets, but spenders￿aggregate saving is less
than the government￿ s borrowing. It follows from (37) that output is higher from period
t + 1 onwards, relative to the ex ante equilibrium. Therefore, the increase in the labor
supply of spenders dominates the reduction in that of savers.
The temporary increase in government expenditure thus increases production in both
the short run and the long run. This contrasts with the e⁄ect of the tax cut analyzed
earlier. Whether production is higher from period t+1 onwards than in period t depends
on the distribution of savers and spenders. The higher the proportion of spenders, the
more likely is Yt+1 > Yt. However, both Yt+1 > Yt > Y and Yt > Yt+1 > Y are possible
following the temporary increase in Gt.
The equilibrium e⁄ect on aggregate demand for domestically produced goods is the
same as on output; relative to the ex ante level, demand is higher in both period t and
from period t + 1 onwards. It is nevertheless interesting to look at the demand e⁄ects
in a slightly more disaggregated manner; i.e., how do the sources of demand adjust to
￿scal policy? We use (15) to show that spenders￿demand for domestic goods in period
t is una⁄ected by the increase in Gt. The higher relative price of domestic goods and
the increase in consumption lead to a zero net e⁄ect on demand for domestic goods
from these households; all their increased consumption goes on foreign goods. Savers
reduce their ￿rst-period consumption, which, combined with a higher relative price, leads
them to reduce their demand for domestic goods. Likewise, exports fall due to the real
appreciation of the exchange rate. Thus, private demand for domestic goods falls, but
not by as much as public consumption. This produces a positive demand e⁄ect of higher
Gt in the ￿rst period.
From period t + 1, there is no stimulus from government demand, but the relative
price is lower than both the ex ante price and that in period t. It is also easy to show
that demand from spenders falls relative to the ex ante and period t levels. Against this,
there is higher demand from savers and foreigners (due to the depreciation), and these
increases are su¢ cient to ensure that demand from period t+1 is above its ex ante level.
Equation (51) in (49) implies the following trade balance in period t:
TBt = ￿
￿￿￿Gt
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿) ￿ Gt
￿ 0:
24Although the government consumes only domestic goods, the increase Gt leads to a
deterioration of the trade balance in period t. This is because demand from abroad
falls and domestic households switch to foreign goods. Given that the economy, by
assumption, has no initial foreign assets, this implies a current account de￿cit in period
t. In the new stationary equilibrium, from period t+1, the economy runs a trade surplus
that is equal to the interest payments on its foreign debt, so that the current account
returns to balance.
Finally, in this section, note that in our model temporary changes in demand due to
tax cuts or increased public spending have permanent e⁄ects. Changes in transfers or
spending today a⁄ect the level of future transfers or spending through the public budget
constraint, thereby having implications for future labor supply and relative prices. For
the same reason, short-term changes in demand have permanent e⁄ects on the real ex-
change rate, even though our model incorporates constant returns to scale in production.
6 Final comments
In this paper, we have extended the savers-spenders framework of Mankiw (2000) to
study ￿scal policy in a small open economy. Coupled with endogenous labor supply,
we have shown that this gives rise to a number of mechanisms and results that di⁄er
from those of closed-economy models, as well as from other open-economy models. In
particular, tax cuts have a short-run contractionary e⁄ect and increased public spending
has a short-run expansionary e⁄ect. Although consistent with recent empirical work,
these results contrast with those of most other models.
While our motivation for including savers and spenders in the analysis of ￿scal policy
is the same as that of Mankiw (2000) and Gal￿ et al. (2003), the e⁄ects of heterogeneity
in our model di⁄er from their closed-economy models. Openness allows policy to a⁄ect
relative prices in the absence of price rigidities. For this reason, savers do not behave
as they would have done were there no spenders; whether ￿irrational￿spenders invite
￿rational￿savers to respond in the same or in the opposite direction depends on features
of the savers￿utility function. Thus, in general, savers may magnify or dampen responses
by spenders.
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26A A general consumption function for savers
We derive the general consumption function for savers, taking into account the equilib-








Equations (8) and (18), together with (11), imply furthermore that the intertemporal














































































That is, the optimal consumption of savers is the annuity value of total consolidated
discounted real wealth times the weight on consumption in the utility function.
B Proof of Proposition 2
By substituting from (42) and (15) into (30), we obtain the following implicit relationship
between pt and Tt:
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27(Recall that (1 + r) ￿ rpt = pt+1 > 0.) From (B.3), dpt=dTt > 0 when ￿ ￿ 1.
Suppose that ￿ < 1 and that pt falls when transfers increase (i.e., pt < 1). From
(B.3):
A >
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
2 > 1:
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This is positive when pt < 1. However, (B.4) shows that A = 1 when pt = 1. Since A
is a continuous function of pt, this implies that A ￿ 1 for any pt ￿ 1. This violates the
necessary condition for dpt=dTt < 0, which, therefore, is not a feasible response to a tax
cut.
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